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a study from selected MENA countries   
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Abstract 
This paper seeks to examine the effect of remittances on economic growth in Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) countries. Using unbalanced panel data covering a sample of 12 MENA 
countries over the period 1984-2012, we studied the hypothesis that the effect of remittances 
on economic growth varies depending on the level of financial development and institutional 
environment in recipient countries. We use GMM estimation in which we address the 
endogeneity of remittances. Our results reveal a complementary relationship among financial 
development and remittances to ensure economic growth.  The estimations also show that 
remittances promote growth in countries with a developed financial system and a strong 
institutional environment.  
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Highlights 
 
 We examine the effect of remittances on growth, in particular how the local financial 
sector and institutional environment influence this effect.  
 We employ panel data for 12 MENA countries. 
 We find that remittances promote growth in countries with a developed financial 
system and strong institutional environment. 
 
1. Introduction 
The increase in the volume of international migration over recent decades has led to an 
unprecedented increase in financial flows to labor-exporting countries. Indeed, international 
migrant remittances have begun to be a significant source of external financing for developing 
countries. Only considering remittances passing through formal channels, the World Bank 
estimates that remittances reached US$ 440 billion in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). In fact, 
remittances sent to developing countries have increased spectacularly over the last three 
decades to represent the large majority of remittance flows today. According to the World Bank 
(2014), formally recorded remittances sent to developing countries reached US$ 325.5 billion 
in 2010. After a modest decline in 2009 because of the global financial crisis, the flow of 
remittances to developing countries was expected to grow at a lower but sustainable rate of 7-
8 percent annually during 2013-2018 to reach US$ 550 billion by 2016. However, remittances 
benefit some regions more than others. With US$ 73 billion of remittances, the MENA region 
is one of the top remittance recipients in the world after East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
However, the recorded data on remittances is imperfect and underestimates the true 
amount. On the one hand, many developing countries do not report remittance data in their 
balance of payments (e.g. Afghanistan, Cuba). On the other hand, since fees for sending money 
(for example, those of banking systems or established money transfer operators) are relatively 
high, remittances are often sent via informal channels such as friends, relatives and the Hawala 
system. El-Qorchi, Munzele and Wilson (2003) argue that the informal flows are estimated to 
be very high, in the range of 10% to 50% of recorded remittances.  Remittance fees are known 
to be high; the World Bank estimates the cost to be about 10% of the amount sent. At the same 
time, there is a huge variation in the fees depending on the. Migrants might access official 
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services, but the high costs of operations may discourage others migrants with low revenue 
from sending small amounts. Moreover, financial services may be accessible to migrants, but 
this will not be the situation for the receivers. High costs are mostly due to socioeconomic 
factors, the financial market and government policy in the sending and the receiving countries.  
In literature surveys, the macroeconomic effects of remittances have been the subject of 
renewed attention in recent years. While some studies have provided evidence that remittances 
may increase investments (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007 ; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009), 
make human capital accumulation easy (Edwards and Ureta, 2003 ; Rapoport and Docquier, 
2005 ;  Calero, Bedi and Sparrow, 2009 ; Combes and Ebeke, 2011), enhance total factor 
productivity (Abdih et al., 2012) and alleviate poverty (Akobeng, 2016 ; Majeed, 2015 ;  Adams 
Jr and Cuecuecha, 2013), other studies have pointed out that remittances may significantly 
reduce work effort (Chami et al., 2005), create moral hazards (Gubert, 2002), accelerate 
inflation (Khan and Islam, 2013), and lead to Dutch disease effects i.e. an appreciation in the 
real exchange rate accompanied by resource allocation from the traded sector towards the non-
traded sector (Amuedo-Dorantes, Pozo and Vargas-Silva, 2010 ;  Bourdet and Falck, 2006 ; 
Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman, 2009). However, the majority of these studies have only 
focused on the direct effects of remittances and they do not incorporate the indirect effects. In 
this literature, the authors regressed per capita growth on both the workers remittances and a 
set of control variables. Some of these control variables also include the channels through which 
remittances affect growth. Such specifications are likely to give unreliable estimates because 
the channels may also capture the growth effects of remittances. Thus, migrants’ remittances 
may reduce the volatility of income, promote the financial sector and increase the quality of 
institutions. They can also promote both human and physical capital investment. The aim of 
this paper is to examine the indirect link between remittances and growth in MENA countries, 
looking specifically at the interaction between remittances and financial development, on the 
one hand, and between remittances and the level of institutional quality, on the other hand. To 
do this, a number of interaction variables have been included in the empirical investigations to 
gauge the best conditions in which remittances can involve economic growth. 
Our several regressions show that a solid financial system and stable political 
environment complement the positive effect of remittances on economic growth. The remainder 
of this paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a literature survey of the 
relationships between remittances and economic growth. Section 3 describes the data, model 
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specification and econometric technique. Section 4 discusses our empirical results, and finally, 
section 4 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Literature survey  
For the receiving countries, there are serval channels through which remittances may 
affect economic growth. Remittances can increase the national disposable income, household 
savings, domestic investment and the accumulation of physical and human capital. They can 
reduce the volatility of production and consumption. However, an excessive volume of 
migrant’s remittances may affect currency appreciation, which negatively affects the 
competitiveness of exports or creates a moral hazard problem by inducing disincentives to 
work.  
However, neither theoretical nor empirical studies have provided a conclusive answer 
regarding the effect of remittances on economic growth. Faini (2002) provides evidence that 
remittances have a positive effect on economic growth. However, Chami, Fullenkamp and 
Jahjah (2003) find a negative correlation between remittances and growth. The authors have 
argued that remittances are likely to substitute work for leisure, generally known as moral 
hazard. Lucas (2005) and the IMF World Economic Outlook (2005) criticize Chami’s study for 
not taking into account remittances’ endogeneity problem. In the Philippines, using Impulse 
Response Functions and annual data for 1985-2002, Burgess and Haksar (2005) report a 
negative indication between remittance and growth measured by the growth rate of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. However, Ang (2009) concludes that the overall impact of 
remittances on growth is positive for the same country. Ziesemer (2012) provides a study 
suggesting that the effect of remittances on economic growth is more visible in low-income 
countries (income lower than 1200 USD per capita). Moreover, the author shows that the 
growth rate is two percentage points higher in the presence of remittances. For Latin American 
countries, Mundaca (2009) uses the domestic bank credit as a regressor to examine the effect 
of remittances on growth. She also finds a positive effect of remittances on economic growth. 
According to the author, a 10% increase in remittances (as a percentage of the GDP) contributes 
to increasing the GDP per capita by 3.49%. When she removes domestic bank credit from the 
equation, the GDP per capita increases only by 3.18%. 
Most recently, in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Singh et al. (2011) report that 
the impact of international remittances on economic growth is negative. However, countries 
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with good governance have more opportunity to unlock the potential for remittances to improve 
economic growth. In a related study, using annual panel data for 64 African, Asian, and Latin 
American-Caribbean countries from 1987–2007, Fayissa and Nsiah (2012) find that there is a 
positive relationship between remittances and economic growth throughout the whole group. 
In contrast, Ahamada and Coulibaly (2013) report that there is no causality between remittances 
and growth in 20 SSA countries. Adams and Klobodu (2016) using the General Method of 
Moments estimation technique, examine the effect of remittances and regime durability on 
economic growth find that remittances do not have a robust impact on economic growth in 
SSA. 
Until the last decade, most empirical studies seemed to neglect other channels through 
which remittances can stimulate economic growth. As we stated above, remittances can 
increase the volume of disposable income and savings.  Thus, they can stimulate the investment 
rate and hence economic growth. In Pakistan, Adams, Jr (2003) shows that international 
remittances have a positive effect on the saving rate. For the author, the marginal propensity to 
save for international remittances is 0.71, while the marginal propensity to save on rental 
income is only 0.085. Moreover, the author demonstrates that the Pakistani households 
receiving remittances have a very high propensity to save, and the effect of remittances on 
growth could be amplified if remittances are channeled by the banking sector. In Kyrgyzstan, 
Aitymbetov (2006) finds also that remittances positively affect economic growth because about 
10% of transfers are invested.  Woodruff (2007) confirms the finding since he finds a positive 
relationship between investment and the creation of micro-enterprises. For the author, 5% of 
remittances received are invested in this type of company. In long term, they can be seen as a 
"growth locomotive" because they improve the labor supply. Finally, in five Mediterranean 
countries,  Glytsos (2005) investigates the impact of exogenous shocks of remittances on 
consumption, investment, imports, and output. He builds a Keynesian model in which he 
includes the remittances as part of disposable income and finds a positive effect of income on 
consumption and imports. For the author, the effect of remittances on growth passes through 
the income disposable and investment channels.  
These empirical studies investigate the direct effect of remittances on the determinants 
of economic growth. However, other researchers have investigated the indirect effect by 
incorporating an interaction terms between international remittances and other variables that 
could complement the direct effect in stimulating growth. Fajnzylber et al. (2008) explores for 
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Latin American countries the remittances’ effect on real per capita growth. The authors include 
as a regressor a term of interaction between remittances and human capital, political institutions 
and the financial system depth. They find a negative indication of the remittances’ coefficient 
and a positive indication of the interaction term when human capital and institutions are 
included. However, the remittances coefficient has a positive indication and the interaction term 
has a negative indication when financial system depth is included. Fajnzylber et al. (2008) 
conclude that human capital accumulation and improvement in institutional quality enhance the 
positive effect of remittances on economic growth. But financial depth substitutes for 
international remittances in stimulating growth. On the basis of these findings, remittances are 
considered to be ineffective in enhancing economic development in countries where institutions 
are weak or where there is low human capital accumulation. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) 
conducted a study similar to Mundaca’s. They used financial development in interaction with 
remittances as regressor and found that remittances may ease credit constraints on the poor, 
increase the allocation of capital, and substitute for the absence of financial development. In 
addition, Bettin and Zazzaro (2012) include an interaction variable (remittances multiplied by 
bank efficiency index) and find a complementary relation between remittances and financial 
development (i.e. remittances have a positive indication and the interaction term has a negative 
indication). Like Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Catrinescu et al. (2009) use political and 
institutional variables as terms of interaction with remittance. The authors, using the Anderson-
Hsio estimator, found a positive relation between transfers and growth. However, Barajas, 
Chami and Fullenkamp (2009) use microeconomics variables as instruments to thwarting 
potential endogeneity between remittances and growth. They find non-significant direct effects 
of growth of remittances in an estimate for a panel of 84 developing countries. 
The literature review reveals that the effect of remittances on economic growth is 
influenced by the observed and in observed countries specific effect, the endogeneity of 
remittances and by the econometric specification. Accordingly, we control for this factor in our 
analysis and also take into consideration the level of political environment in MENA countries. 
The model specification and the econometric technique are described next. 
3. Model specification and econometric technique 
3.1. Model specification and estimation method  
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To examine the links among remittances, financial development, institutional quality 
and economic growth, we have used an extended version of the growth model of Barro (1991 ;  
1996) and Imai et al. (2014). The following reduced-form regression is used:   
GrowthGDPit=0+1Remit+it+ ηt +ϑi+it  (1) 
Here, GrowthGDPit indicates the (logarithm of) growth of real GDP per capita in 
country i at time t.  REMit is the key explanatory variable referring to the ratio of the remittances 
to GDP. Remittances are the current transfers sent by resident or nonresident workers to the 
country of origin. ηt is the time specific effect, ϑi is an unobserved country specific effect and 
εit is the error term. Xit contains a standard set of determinants of economic growth.  
As a starting point, we do not include any variables for financial development or 
institutional quality. However, in a second set of regressions, we test the hypothesis that the 
responsiveness of economic growth to remittances depends on the level of financial 
development and the level of institutional quality. In other words, we explore how the financial 
depth or the institutional quality level of the recipient country affects the impact of remittances 
on economic growth. The novelty of our paper lies in its estimation of the combined effect of 
remittances and our conditional variables (financial development or the institutional quality). 
To this end, we introduce in Equation (1) an interaction term between remittances and the 
financial development level or the institutional quality. The modified versions of Equation (1) 
that include the interactive terms can be written as:  
GrowthGDPit=i+1Remit+2(Remit Findvpit)+3Findvpit+it+ ηt +ϑi+it  (2) 
 
GrowthGDPit=i+1Remit+2(Remit InsQit)+3InsQit+it+ ηt +ϑi+it  (3) 
 
In Equation (2) we test whether remittances and financial development should 
complement or substitute for each other. However, in Equation (3) we test the hypothesis that 
the institutional quality of the recipient country influences the capacity of remittances to affect 
economic growth. However, this paper is interested in β1 and β2, which provide information on 
the marginal impact2 of remittances on growth conditional upon the financial development level 
or the institutional quality. β1 and β2 make it possible to assess whether remittances have 
different influences on growth in countries with high values of financial development/ 
                                                 
2 β1 measures the direct effect while β2 represents to the indirect effect.  
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institutional quality. In Equation (2), if β2 is negative, remittances are more effective in 
promoting growth in countries with a shallower finance system. In other words, a negative 
interaction means that remittances have de facto acted as a substitute for financial services to 
enhance economic growth. However, a positive interaction suggests that remittances and the 
financial system are complements (a better functioning financial system would lead remittances 
towards growth-enhancement). In a similar way, in Equation (3), a positive interaction would 
indicate that the institutional quality enhances the positive effect of remittances on growth3. 
Otherwise, when the interaction is negative, the institutional quality diminishes (β1 > 0) or 
alleviates (β1< 0) the negative impact of remittances on growth. 
An important methodological challenge is related to the presence of endogenous 
regressors. Thus, the presence of a lag-dependent variable on the right hand of  the equation, 
the inverse causality relationship between remittances and growth (i.e. remittances may affect 
the growth of the receiving countries and thereby affect the future amount of remittances 
received), reverse causality between  the dependent variables and some of our explanatory 
variables (i.e. remittances, revenue, inflation, GDP growth and the quality of institutions) will 
lead to simultaneity bias of the regression’s coefficients. Analysts who consider this 
endogeneity problem often use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM 
estimator has the advantage that it is more efficient than the OLS estimator. It is also widely 
known as a solution to measurement errors (errors in variables) and omitted-variable biases  
(Guillaumont S and Kpodar, 2006). For the endogenous variables, we rely on the internal 
instruments that are one lag variables. To check the validity of the instruments, the 
Sargan/Hansen test has been applied. In addition, a number of econometric tests have been 
investigated (tests of collinearity, causality and endogeneity). 
Differentiating equations (2) and (3) with respect to remittances, we can check if 
remittances have a different influence on growth in countries with high values of financial 
development4 (institutional quality5) as well as countries with low values. Moreover, according 
                                                 
3 when β1 is negative, the institutional quality reduces the negative effects of remittances on growth. 
4 Equation 4 
5 Equation 5 
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to Equations (4) and (5), Equation (6) captures the complete relationship between remittances 
and GDP per capita growth for different levels of financial development (institutional quality) 
GDP/REM12  Findvpit  (4) 
GDP/REM12 InstQit  (5) 
12Findvp(InstQ)  Rem (6) 
3.2. Variable definitions and data 
 
To capture the role of financial development and institutional level on the effect of 
remittances on growth, we use respectively three and four proxies. For the financial 
development proxy, all variables are related to the banking sector. First, to evaluate the financial 
intermediation, we use first domestic credit to the private sector by banks as a percentage of 
GDP. The second variable represents liquid liabilities (broad money) as part of GDP. This 
variable is defined as the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank liquid liabilities 
divided by GDP. It is used as a proxy of the size of financial intermediaries relative to the size 
of the economy. Finally, the bank efficiency ratio is also used. This proxy gives us an idea of 
banking productivity. The ratio is a quick and easy measure of a bank's ability to turn resources 
into revenue. The ratio is defined as the sum of expenses (without interest expenses) divided 
by the revenue. The following variables have been chosen to form the financial indicator of 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Similarly, institutional quality level is proxied by 
International Country Risk Guide index of political risk. In accordance with Bekaert et al. 
(2006), we use the Political Institutions Index, wich the sum of the subcomponents military in 
politics and democratic accountability. The quality of the Institutions Index is used to capture 
corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. We also use the Socioeconomic 
Environment Index that is indicative of stability, socioeconomic conditions, and the investment 
profile. Finally, we use the Conflict Risk Index to capture the internal and external conflict. 
As mentioned above, remittances include personal transfers and compensation of 
employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received 
by resident households to or from nonresident households. Personal transfers thus include all 
current transfers between resident and nonresident individuals. Compensation of employees 
refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an 
economy where they are not resident, and of residents employed by nonresident entities. The 
remittances variable is scaled by the home country’s GDP. The choice of the variables and the 
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proxies of the detriments of growth is guided by the literature (Barro, 1996; Giuliano and Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009 ; Combe and Ebeke, 2011 ; Imai, K. et al., 2014). These variables consist of past 
GDPt-1 to test the convergence hypothesis (Barro, 1996). Investment represent the gross fixed 
capital formation as a percentage of real GDP is used as a proxy for investment in physical 
capital. Trade openness is defined by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports over GDP is 
used to evaluate the country's degree of openness. The inflation rate is a proxy to monetary 
discipline and macroeconomic stability. Government consumption is defined as the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP. The full sample dataset comprises an unbalanced panel of 
12 countries and both four-year average and annual data covering the period 1984 – 2012. The 
initial year is chosen due to availability. The summary statistics, the variable definitions as well 
as data sources are provided in the appendix A (Table 1 and Table 2). 
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Table 3: Remittances, financial development and growth (GMM-System estimation) 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita  growth 
Annual data 4 year average data 
 
Fin. devp 1 Fin. devp 2 Fin. devp 3  Fin. devp 1 Fin. devp 2 Fin. devp 3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
GDPt-1 per capita 
-0.9940 
(0.25)*** 
-0.4545 
(0.10)*** 
-1.4534 
(0.39)*** 
-2.4551 
(0.09)*** 
-0.4550 
(0.34)*** 
-2.4532 
(0.45)*** 
1.1492 
(0.11)*** 
-0.7950 
(0.07)*** 
-0.8843 
(0.10)*** 
-0.9093 
(0.09)*** 
-0.8391 
(0.09)*** 
-0.4344 
(0.11)*** 
-0.7986 
(0.07)*** 
0.7492 
(0.11)*** 
Investment 
0.4595 
(0.11)** 
0.5566 
(0.34)* 
1.3554 
(0.61)** 
0.4534 
(0.21)** 
1.4850 
(0.43)** 
0.5556 
(0.18)*** 
0.8248 
(0.32)** 
0.5181 
(0.21)** 
0.4157 
(0.24)* 
1.0927 
(0.41)** 
0.6284 
(0.24)** 
0.8248 
(0.32)** 
0.5976 
(0.20)*** 
0.1248 
(0.32)** 
Human capital 
0.1984 
(0.24) 
0.0545 
(0.16) 
-0.1458 
(0.47) 
0.3453 
(0.43) 
0.8643 
(0.45) 
0.1445 
(0.16) 
0.2664 
(0.31) 
0.1625 
(0.19) 
0.0029 
(0.36) 
-0.1348 
(0.47) 
0.0380 
(0.23) 
0.0229 
(0.31) 
0.1298 
(0.19) 
0.1229 
(0.31) 
Government spending 
-0.8593 
(0.28)** 
-0.5346 
(0.32)** 
-1.4523 
(0.51)** 
-0.3563 
(0.18)** 
-0.4554 
(0.29) 
-0.4548 
(0.08)*** 
-0.4564 
(0.39) 
-1.5890 
(0.18)** 
-0.5583 
(0.20)** 
-1.0023 
(0.41)** 
-0.5027 
(0.20)** 
-0.1531 
(0.29) 
-0.5398 
(0.18)*** 
-0.2531 
(0.19) 
Population growth 
-0.2543 
(0.09)*** 
-0.5543 
(0.33)*** 
-0.3535 
(0.65) 
-0.2342 
(0.08)*** 
-0.5424 
(0.34) 
-0.4635 
(0.11)*** 
-0.3466 
(0.56) 
-0.2962 
(0.09)*** 
-0.3720 
(0.10)*** 
-0.2633 
(0.24) 
-0.3438 
(0.10)*** 
-0.1231 
(0.12) 
-0.2846 
(0.09)*** 
-0.3236 
(0.62) 
Openness 
-0.2455 
(0.33) 
-0.1375 
(0.14)* 
-0.4549 
(0.21)** 
-0.3433 
(0.39) 
-0.5324 
(0.33) 
-1.4433 
(0.45)* 
-0.4450 
(0.56) 
-0.2415 
(0.13) 
-0.0975 
(0.14)* 
-0.6507 
(0.31)** 
-0.1958 
(0.15) 
-0.1628 
(0.20) 
-0.2132 
(0.13)* 
-0.5324 
(0.26) 
Inflation 
-0.2353 
(0.24) 
0.0465 
(0.32) 
-0.4568 
(0.77) 
-0.3533 
(0.65) 
-0.8666 
(0.54) 
-0.3653 
(0.65) 
-0.2662 
(0.64) 
-0.1425 
(0.53) 
-0.0975 
(0.32) 
0.1958 
(0.23) 
0.6507 
(0.65) 
-0.6507 
(0.43) 
-0.1958 
(0.45) 
-0.3423 
(0.44) 
Remittances 
-0.3450 
(0.50) 
-0.5669 
(0.54) 
0.0465 
(0.03)** 
0.3434 
(0.54) 
-0.1454 
(0.53)** 
0.2553 
(0.34) 
-0.5454 
(0.16)*** 
-0.0688 
(0.04) 
-0.0339 
(0.09) 
0.0453 
(0.04)** 
0.0694 
(0.01)* 
-0.4352 
(0.18)** 
0.1694 
(0.04) 
-0.4634 
(0.18)*** 
Financial development  1 
 0.3423 
(0.13)** 
0.1379 
(0.07)** 
     0.2623 
(0.11)** 
0.2947 
(0.23)* 
    
Remittances ×  Fin. 
development  1 
  0.1340 
(0.06)** 
      0.2215 
(0.10)** 
    
Financial development  2 
   0.4544 
(0.28)* 
0.4534 
(0.56)* 
     0.1830 
(0.09)** 
0.2424 
(0.14)* 
  
Remittances ×  Fin. 
development  2 
    0.1452 
(0.03)** 
      0.1873 
(0.01)** 
  
Financial development  3 
     1.2424 
(0.64)* 
0.4643 
(0.22)* 
     0.1830 
(0.09)** 
0.1674 
(0.13)* 
Remittances ×  Fin. 
development  3 
      0.5543 
(0.33)** 
      0.1453 
(0.01)** 
Observations 245 254 268 258 267 2261 240 58 54 57 56 52 58 55 
AR (1) (0.000) (0.001) (0.033) (0.001) (0,001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.030) (0.001) (0,001) (0.020) (0.000) 
AR (2) (0.142) (0.331) (0.553) (0.538) (0,198) (0,539) (0. 313) (0.342) (0.331) (0.539) (0.138) (0,398) (0,539) (0. 333) 
Hansen (p-value) (0.114) (0.154) (0.133) (0.433) (0,443) (0,236) (0.243) (0.394) (0.144) (0.136) (0.487) (0,487) (0,136) (0.263) 
Financial development 1: Financial intermediation. Financial development 2: Liquid liabilities. Financial development 3 : Bank efficiency ratio. For the Sargan test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments do not correlate with the 
residuals. The Hansen statistic tests the validity of our instruments. For the test for autocorrelation AR (2), the null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. Standard errors 
in parenthesis. ***, **, * refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 4: Remittance institutions’ quality and growth 
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Independent variables 
Dependent variables : GDP per capita growth (Annual data) 
InstQ= ICRG InstQ= ICRG 1 InstQ= ICRG 2 InstQ= ICRG 3 InstQ= ICRG 4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
GDPt-1 per capita 
-0.1855 
(0.13)*** 
-1.2340 
(0.09)*** 
-2.5741 
(1.09)* 
-3.5734 
(0.44)*** 
-2.4432 
(0.45)*** 
-2.9482 
(0.41)*** 
-0.7950 
(0.07)*** 
-2.3424 
(0.39)*** 
-0.8573 
(0.03)*** 
-0.8464 
(0.04)*** 
Investment 
1.5346 
(0.24)*** 
1.0093 
(0.49)* 
0.7634 
(0.25)** 
1.4432 
(0.31)** 
1.5536 
(0.33)*** 
1.0495 
(0.32)** 
1.5181 
(0.41)** 
1.9483 
(1.03)** 
0.7432 
(0.30)** 
0.4403 
(0.34)** 
Human capital 
0.4343* 
(0.22) 
-0.8933 
(1.47) 
1.4940 
(1.56) 
0.6422 
(1.22) 
2.4542* 
(1.36) 
0.5452 
(1.31) 
0.1625 
(0.19) 
-0.1348 
(1.47) 
2.4638 
(3.23) 
1.8963 
(0.32) 
Government spending 
-1.00043 
(0.11)*** 
-1.0344 
(1.51)** 
-0.5698 
(0.05)*** 
-0.1643 
(1.43) 
-0.4553 
(0.48)*** 
-0.5322 
(1.39) 
-1.5890 
(0.18)*** 
-1.0023 
(0.31)** 
-0.8320 
(0.21)** 
-0.0484 
(0.43) 
Population Growth 
-0.3334 
(0.23)* 
-1.2440 
(1.65) 
-2.1322 
(0.98)** 
-2.4052 
(1.32)* 
-1.1553 
(0.29)** 
-0.3533 
(3.54) 
-0.2962 
(0.09)*** 
-0.2633 
(0.44) 
-0.5322 
(0.21)*** 
-0.0393 
(0.43) 
Openness 
-0.1475 
(0.17) 
-0.4547 
(0.31)** 
-0.2402 
(0.32) 
-0.2445 
(0.43) 
-1.4532 
(0.45)* 
-0.4324 
(0.56) 
-0.2415 
(0.63) 
-0.6507 
(0.21)** 
-0.3426 
(0.81) 
-0.4034 
(0.33) 
Remittances 
0.5669 
(0.54) 
-1.8354 
(0.55)** 
1.0831 
(1.54) 
-0.9423 
(0.32)** 
0.4533 
(2.03) 
-0.9545 
(0.14)*** 
-0.0688 
(0.14) 
-0.8694 
(0.24)** 
0.00332 
(0.04) 
-0.0843 
(0.21)** 
ICRG -0.1543 (0.03)** -0.1734 (0.05)**         
Remittances ×   ICRG  0.0305 (0.00)***         
ICRG 1   -2.8392  (2.84) -0.3432 (0.26)       
Remittances ×   ICRG 1    0.9832 (0.63)*       
ICRG 2     0.8742 (1.34) 1.0344 (1.12)     
Remittances ×   ICRG 2      0.9534 (0.33)**     
ICRG 3       0.8770 (2.54) 0.4643 (1.12)   
Remittances ×   ICRG 3        0.5543 (0.03)***   
ICRG 4         2.2342 (2.34) 0.4435 (0.12) 
Remittances ×   ICRG 4          0.3433 (0.23)** 
Observations 254 268 258 267 251 240 246 257 256 252 
AR (1) (0.001) (0.033) (0.001) (0,001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) (0,001) 
AR (2) (0.331) (0.553) (0.538) (0,198) (0,539) (0. 313) (0.342) (0.539) (0.138) (0,398) 
Hansen (p-value) (0.154) (0.133) (0.433) (0,443) (0,236) (0.243) (0.394) (0.136) (0.487) (0,487) 
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ICRG: institutional quality published by the PRS group. The quality of institutions is an index ranging from 0 (minimum quality) to 100 (maximum quality). ICRG 1 (political institutions): the sum of the subcomponents 
‘military in politics’ and ‘democratic accountability’. ICRG2 (quality of institutions): is the sum of corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. ICRG3 (socioeconomic environment): sum of government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, and investment profile. ICRG4 (conflicts): internal and external conflict, ethnic and religious tensions. Standard errors in parenthesis.***, **, * refer to the 1, 5 and 10% levels of significance 
respectively. 
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4. Evaluation of the results  
In this section, we present the results obtained from the estimations of our models. This 
analysis will primarily focus on our variables of interest (remittances, financial development, 
and institution quality), although we analyze the results obtained from the variables of control. 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the GMM dynamic estimations. The estimation regressions 
satisfy mutually the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the serial correlation test. 
In all our results, the Hansen test shows that our instruments are valid (do not reject the null 
hypothesis). Moreover, AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first order and second order serial 
correlation in the first differenced residuals under the null of no serial correlation. 
The results of the benchmark model are reported in table 3, columns 1 (annual data) and 
8 (4-year average data). The estimations show that the coefficient of the GDP lag is negative 
and indicate the presence of a convergence process. The poor countries grow faster than rich 
economies, once the determinants of their steady state are held constant. These results are 
consistent with the standard growth theory which suggests that the economy tends to approach 
its long run position if the starting per capita is low (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995  ; Easterly 
and Levine, 1995). As expected, a positive correlation between investment and economic 
growth is found. A higher level of private investment leads to higher economic growth. 
However, population growth rate, trade openness and government spending negatively affect 
the rate of economic growth (Jongwanich, 2007 ;  Acosta et al., 2009). This finding seems to 
validate the idea that higher involvement of the government in the economy will have 
significate consequences on the growth performance ( (Fölster and Henrekson, 2001). Finally, 
the effects of human capital and inflation are insignificant although the coefficients change 
from one specification to another. 
Moving to our key variables, we can see that all our measures of financial development 
are positive and statistically different to zero. However, the estimated coefficients of 
remittances are not statistically different from zero (remittances do not have a strong impact on 
economic growth). These findings are consistent with Barajas, Chami and Fullenkamp (2009), 
but in contrast to the literature reviews that have found a positive effect of remittances on 
consumption, investment, and health outcomes. These results lead to a question about the nature 
of the relationship between remittances and growth. This relationship seems to be nonlinear. In 
other words, the effect of remittances on economic growth may depend on other variables. 
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Thus, we explore this avenue by investigating whether the financial development and the 
institutional level of the receiving countries influence the effect of remittances on the 
performance of economic growth. 
First, we estimate Equation (2) in which a number of interaction variables have been 
added. We explore whether there is a substitutability or complementarity relationship between 
remittances and financial development in promoting economic growth in MENA countries. 
Columns 3 to 14 present the outcomes of the regression models for both annual and four-year 
average data. In each column, we use one proxy of financial development. The estimated 
coefficients of remittances and the interaction term are significantly negative. As we explain 
above, the remittances and the financial development have a complementary effect in boosting 
the growth of GDP. This finding suggests that remittances have a positive effect on economic 
growth only if the domestic banking system is sufficiently sound. Similar findings were also 
obtained by Bettin and Zazzaro (2012) and Nyamongo et al.(2012). However, these results are 
not in line with Barajas, Chami and Fullenkamp (2009), and Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz’s (2009) 
studies which supported the complementary view. Unlike our study, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
use only measures of the size of the financial sector, ignoring its efficiency.  
Otherwise, taking the ratio of domestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP as 
the measure of financial development, the threshold from which remittances could have a 
positive effect on economic growth is 2.326 while the sample mean is 2.49. This means that 
only a few countries can concretely benefit from remittances. Based on column 12, the direct 
effect is -0.4352. This is much larger than the indirect effect in absolute terms 0.1830 (the 
elasticity of economic growth with respect to remittances). For example, in the case of Turkey, 
the total effect is 0.034, obtained by multiplying 0.1830 by the Turkish financial development 
mean and adding -0.4352. This indicates that a 1% increase in the share of remittances in GDP 
leads to a 0.034% increase in the GDP per capita growth ratio. However, in Egypt, a 1% 
increase in remittances leads to a 0.20% decrease in the GDP per capita growth ratio. Figures 
1 in the appendix shows the impact of remittances on GDP per capita computed for each country 
at the mean level of the ratio of domestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP. Out of 
12 countries considered in the analysis, only Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco seem to benefit 
overall from remittances (Appendix B, Figure 1). 
                                                 
6 -β1/β2= -(-1,8354/0,0305) = 60 
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Finally, in table 4 we report the estimates of Equation (2) to test the interaction between 
remittances, economic growth, and the institutional environment. In other words, the 
specification allows us to test the hypothesis that the effect of remittances on growth is 
conditioned by the institutional quality. We present five specifications. In the first, we use the 
composite institutional index (ICRG). This index published by the PRS group7 is composite 
Political, Financial, Economic Risk rating. It’s ranging from 0 for very high risk to 100 for very 
low risk. In the other specifications, we only use the four components of this composite index 
(ICRG 1, ICRG2, ICRG3, ICRG4). The estimates show two very important results. First, the 
results show that the interaction variables and remittances are negative and significant (column 
2, table 4). This suggests that the marginal effect of remittances is higher in countries with a 
more stable political environment. Second, for our sample, the results illustrate the presence of 
a threshold effect beyond which remittances can be a growth enhancer. In order for remittances 
to contribute to economic growth, MENA countries must possess a level of institutional quality 
greater than the threshold level of 60%8. Out of 12 countries considered in the analysis, only 
Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco seem to benefit overall from remittances (Appendix B, Figure 2). 
These findings are consistent with Catrinescu et al. (2009). For the authors, a low level of ethnic 
tension, good governance, the prevalence of law and order and good socioeconomic conditions 
are preconditions for the successful use of migrant remittances.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the interaction between remittances, financial development, level 
of the institutional environment and economic growth in 12 MENA countries. The study covers 
the period of 1984-2012. After controlling the endogeneity bias of remittances by using GMM 
estimation, our results suggest that the impact of remittances on economic growth depends on 
the level of financial development and the institutional environment. More precisely, a high 
level of financial development and a strong institutional environment are required to enable 
remittances to enhance growth. 
                                                 
7 http://www.prsgroup.com/ 
8 -β1/β2= -(-0,4352/0,1873) = 60. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min Max Observations 
GDP per capita growth 1.7950 7.9790 -64.99 53.932 373 
Per capita income 2068.3   1866.1 188.62 10018 357 
Investment 24.282    7.2448   2.9180 58.957 355 
Human capital 75.515 18.640 39.450 118.77 396 
Government spending 16.479      5.4915  2.3316    43.382 374 
Population growth 2.3210     1.1951 -3.3394   7.1075 396 
Openness 70.126     30.914 0.0209    154.23 374 
Inflation 16.814     37.963 -16.117 448.5 340 
Financial development  1 36.062    24.680   1.2660   99.203 333 
Financial development  2 2.4974 0.9895 0.5662 7.5701 205 
Financial development  3 2.4974 0.9895 0.5662 7.5701 205 
Remittances 3.7842 0.2133 3.2665 4.3085 211 
ICRG 34.273     28.138           0 75 207 
ICRG 1 0.3976 4.3424 -26,455 9.3442 207 
ICRG 2 0.0544 4.6485 -28,345 8.8654 205 
ICRG 3 9.45454 3.4331 4.4245 19.3050 210 
ICRG 4 8.8654 3.2631 4.8055 20.3050 215 
 
Table 2: List of variables 
Variable Description and source 
Growth Real per capita growth (WDI-Word Bank)  
Lagged GDP Lagged real per capita income, expressed in log form. (WDI-Word Bank)  
Remittances 
Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, received (% of GDP) expressed in log-
form (WDI-Word Bank)  
Investment  Gross capital formation (% of GDP) expressed in log-form (WDI-Word Bank)  
Inflation Measured by CPI (annual %) (WDI-Word Bank)  
Human capital Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) (WDI-Word Bank)  
Government spending General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)  (WDI-Word Bank)  
Population growth Population growth (annual %) (WDI-Wolrd Bank)  
Openness 
The sum of exports and imports of goods and services as share of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in log form (WDI-Word Bank)  
Financial development  1 Domestic credit to the private sector by banks as a percentage of GDP (WDI-Word Bank)  
Financial development  2 
The sum of currency and deposits in the central bank liquid liabilities divided by GDP (WDI-
Word Bank)  
Financial development  3 
Bank’s efficiency ratio is a measure of a bank's overhead as a percentage of its revenue (the 
sum of expenses (without interest expenses) divided by the revenue) 
ICRG 
ICRG political risk index (0 : highest risk, 100 : lower risk) (International Country Risk Guide, 
PRS Group) 
ICRG 1 
The sum of the subcomponents ‘military in politics’ and ‘democratic accountability 
(International Country Risk Guide, PRS Group) 
ICRG 2 
The sum of corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality (International Country Risk 
Guide, PRS Group) 
ICRG 3 
The sum of government stability, socioeconomic conditions, and investment profile 
(International Country Risk Guide, PRS Group) 
ICRG 4 
Internal and external conflict, ethnic and religious tensions (International Country Risk Guide, 
PRS Group) 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Remittances on Economic Growth based on each country’s Financial Development 
index value 
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Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Remittances on Economic Growth based on each country’s institutional index value 
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